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Collection societies were created by authors, such as composers and lyric-
writers who on their own could not turn their copyrights into money despite the 
fact that they were granted the legal right to authorise or prohibit other people’s 
commercial use of their musical works. This was because individual authors could 
neither control nor keep track of how their music was used. Collection societies 
were set up to handle the right to perform copyright works to an audience, but 
when the market for recorded music emerged, the societies extended their reach 
to administer mechanical reproduction rights as well as performing rights. Because 
the societies from the beginning were monopolies, indeed had to be monopolies 
to work efficiently in the interests of both creators and users, they have always 
been carefully monitored and regulated. The story of the events that led to the 
creation of the French society SACEM bring all these elements together, creators 
(and publishers), users and a regulator (the courts). 
In 1847 the French composer Bourget visited Les Ambassadeurs, a café in Paris, 
and ordered a glass of sugar water. While sipping this, he heard the string band 
of Les Ambassadeurs perform his composition Bluettes . No one had asked for 
his authorization of this and consequently he protested against this infringement 
of his copyright. An argument ensued and Bourget offered Les Ambassadeurs a 
settlement: if the club let him have his glass of water for free, the band would 
be allowed to play the song for free. Les Ambassadeurs turned down this 
reasonable offer and so it happened that parties met at the Tribunal de Commerce 
de la Seine. The court’s decision of September 8, 1847 was in Bourget’s favour and 
accordingly, backed by two other composers, Perizot and Henrion, and the music 
publisher Colombier, on February 28, 1851 he founded The Société des Auteurs, 
Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique, SACEM. 
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Between 1851 and the early twentieth century, composers and publishers founded 
national collection societies similar to SACEM in much of Europe and in North and 
South America. However, such societies were not generally established in Asia 
and Africa until the 1980s and 1990s, following the process of decolonisation. 
For most of the twentieth century, the world of the collection societies was a 
stable one. The main purpose of this chapter is to show how that interlocking system 
of the nationally-based collective administration of copyrights was shattered, mostly 
by the actions of the collection societies themselves. 
National Societies and the Principle of Reciprocity
As a preliminary to explaining that process, it is necessary to discuss the territorial 
basis of copyright and reciprocity. Copyright laws vary between countries, a 
reflection of the differing powers of users in different territories and of the different 
political priorities of the regulators. Thus, in both the U.S. and Japan the political 
influence of broadcasters has meant that the financial value of the rights of copyright 
owners has been smaller than in other comparably sized territories primarily 
because the performing right is more limited in scope than elsewhere. An example 
of the different priorities of different governments was the rejection in the 1980s 
by the UK government of a private copying levy on the basis that it would be a tax 
and an unnecessary intervention into the market economy, which the Conservative 
government of the time was generally opposed to. 
Despite such differences, the principle of reciprocity has been the central feature 
of the relationships between the national collection societies. When his music 
is performed or recorded in his home country A, a composer receives royalties 
direct from his national society, which makes a small charge for the service. The 
principle of reciprocity ensures that the composer also receives payment when 
the same music is performed or recorded in foreign countries. Thus, the royalties 
for the use of his copyrights in countries B, C, D and so forth are collected by 
the relevant national societies, who, after deducting a charge for their services, 
remit the royalties collected in their territories to the national collection society of 
country A, which, again after making a deduction for its charges, sends on the 
royalties to the appropriate member. 
This strictly national basis of copyright administration was directly challenged by 
the emergence of the ”online” (Internet) market for music, which posed significant 
questions for the collective administration of copyright by raising the issue of the 
greater efficacy of regional (i.e. continent-wide) administration compared with 
nationally-based administration. But even before this development, the actions of 
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the societies themselves had begun to undermine the stability of the system of 
reciprocity that they depended upon. 
The cause of this threat to stability was the emergence in the 1980s of direct 
competition between the various national societies in Europe and the vehicle for 
this competition was known as a “central licensing agreement” (CLA). 
The Central Licensing Story
Record companies and CLA
A central licensing agreement (CLA) is a contract under which an international 
record company undertakes to pay all the mechanical royalties due on soundcarriers 
(CDs, cassettes and vinyl records) sold in a large number of European countries to 
a single national society. In turn, the receiving society will pass on the royalties for 
soundcarriers sold in each country to the appropriate society. The CLA therefore 
largely replaces the nationally-based system of reciprocity already described.
The central licensing system was the result of the desire of large users of 
musical works, the major international record companies, to cut their costs and the 
determination of certain individual national collection societies to increase the flow 
of monies through their systems and thus reduce their own administration costs as 
a proportion of their total income. 
The introduction of CLAs was made easier by the fact that there was already 
an industry-wide agreement setting a common pan-European mechanical royalty 
rate. This was the Standard Contract signed by the International Federation 
of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), representing record companies and the 
International Bureau of Societies Administering the Rights of Mechanical 
Recording and Reproduction (BIEM), representing the continent’s mechanical 
right collection societies.
CLAs now (in 2006) account for some 55 per cent of soundcarriers sold 
throughout Europe. At the present day, all four major international record companies 
have such licensing agreements. Currently the partners in the four CLAs are EMI 
and SDRM (the mechanical right collection society of France), Sony BMG and 
GEMA (the German society), Universal Music International (UMI) and SABAM (the 
Belgian society) and Warner Music Group (WMG) and GEMA.
These partnerships date from 2004 and came about only after fierce competition 
between national collection societies. Before that date SDRM (France), the 
mechanical right society linked to SACEM (France), had a CLA with Sony Music 
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Europe (SME) and, through the Bureau Europèen des Licences (BEL), a joint 
venture with GEMA (Germany). The UK collection society (MCPS) was involved in 
a CLA with EMI. When that contract was not renewed last year, BEL was dissolved 
and SDRM (France) separately negotiated a new CLA with EMI. However, the 
creation of the Sony BMG record company led to the replacement of the SDRM-
SME deal with a CLA between Sony BMG and GEMA, previously the CLA partner 
of BMG. Meanwhile, UMI (in its former guise as PolyGram) had originally operated 
a CLA with Dutch society STEMRA, and then switched to the UK’s MCPS before 
concluding its current CLA with SABAM (Belgium). These changes in CLA 
partnerships took place despite the fact that the costs of moving a CLA to a new 
national society partner are significant and that each change means a temporary 
disruption of the business of the user and its chosen society. 
While the CLAs honoured the principle of reciprocity between national societies 
(in the distribution of royalties to individual authors and publishers), they dramatically 
eroded it at the same time. Societies competed for the business of the major record 
companies by offering those companies rebates on the amount of royalties payable. 
The rebates in effect meant that the society was reducing the revenues due to its 
members (and those of other societies). Each society was doing this in order to 
gain a possible reduction in administration costs but also greater influence within 
the society world, where a society’s power is judged by the size of its turnover. 
Music publishers and CLA
This was not all, for the principle of reciprocity was soon to be further eroded. But 
before explaining that development, it is necessary to understand the attitude of the 
major multinational music publishers to the emergence of CLAs and the general 
situation of collection societies. Ever since the formation of SACEM, publishers 
had been members of the societies, alongside the authors of musical works. 
They were entitled to receive a proportion of the royalties collected, although in 
continental Europe publishers as a whole received less than authors as a whole 
and in some national societies there were restrictions on the participation of 
publishers in decision making.
However, by the mid-twentieth century, the music publishing industry had 
undergone international consolidation in much the same way as the record 
industry so that it was dominated by a handful of large companies under the 
same ownership as the major international record companies. As well objecting to 
various society practices, ranging from social and cultural deductions to the lack 
of seats for music publishers on the boards of many of the societies, these very 
powerful music publishers decried the long delays (as they saw it) in the societies’ 
transmission of royalties and (as they saw it) the disproportionate commissions 
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taken by the societies on the royalties they collected and distributed. They naturally 
also objected to the rebates offered by societies in order to secure CLAs.
In 1996 after putting pressure on the societies to reform with little success, 
EMI Music Publishing (EMI MP) briefly withdrew the right to collect royalties for 
Simply Red’s album “Life” from MCPS (UK). Instead, EMI MP would collect the 
mechanical royalties directly from Simply Red’s record company Warner Music 
Europe through Mechanical Rights Society Europe (MRSE), a collection society it 
specifi cally set up for this purpose. EMI MP said it would take this action because 
of excessive delays in receiving monies through the GEMA-Warner Music Europe 
CLA, and because of the high rebate given by GEMA to WME.
In the event, the threat was withdrawn. But it was enough to cause Europe’s 
largest collecting societies to seek ways to limit the costs of distributing mechanical 
royal ties. At a series of meetings in 1996 the societies agreed that the cost of 
distributing mechanical royalties be regularised, with a commission rate of some 
10 per cent for smaller societies and 8 per cent, or less, for the larger societies. The 
differing rates reflected the fact that, while the average cost of collection through 
CLAs had fallen, the costs of dist ribution varied widely, largely in proportion to the 
size of a society. Thus, while GEMA’s distribution overheads were around 8 per 
cent of its revenues in 1996, those of societies in the smaller European nation 
states, to which GEMA remits money, were far higher. 
This pressure on the societies was further intensified when towards the end of 
1996 PolyGram announced that it would move its CLA from STEMRA (Netherlands) 
to MCPS (UK). As usual part of the deal was a rebate offered by MCPS to PolyGram. 
More contentiously, MCPS also offered to distribute directly mechanical royalties 
collected from PolyGram that were due to composers of any nationality represented 
by PolyGram Music Publishing, bypassing the other societies. A mark of how much 
this was seen as an attack on the principle of reciprocity was that in response 
SDRM (France) and GEMA (Germany) terminated their reciprocal arrangements 
with MCPS (UK) at the end of 1996 and STEMRA (Netherlands) and SIAE (Italy) 
gave notice that they would also end their reciprocal arrangements with MCPS. 
Cannes Accord
Without going into much detail, the final result of these moves by music publishers, 
record companies and the societies was the signing in January 1997 of what is 
generally referred to as the Cannes Accord. Under this the European collection 
societies and the six major record company-owned publishers agreed that the 
societies would reduce their average commission rate for mechanical royalties from 
soundcarrier sales to 6 per cent by 2001. To achieve the average of 6 per cent, 
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societies with smaller turnovers (such as those of Greece and Portugal) would 
bring rates down from 20 per cent to between 9 and 12 per cent while the larger 
societies, notably GEMA and SDRM, were required to reduce their rates to less 
than 6 per cent. The specialist newsletter Music & Copyright (1997) estimated that 
music publishers’ revenue from this source would be some $100 million higher over 
the period covered by the Accord. The Cannes Accord also included an agreement 
that the direct distribution of phono-mechanical royalties by MCPS to PolyGram 
composers would not go ahead.
Other benefits of the Cannes Accord for the music publishers included speeding 
up the transmission of the monies from the societies to the publishers and their 
authors and guaran teed twice-yearly payments to pub lishers with advances set 
against each pay ment. Moreover, because the commission rate was a weighted 
average, the societies became subject to inde pendent audits. 
The Cannes Accord brought peace to the collection society and music publishing 
world, a peace that was extended when a Cannes Accord Extension was agreed 
in 2002. This imposed severe restrictions on the societies’ ability to compete with 
each other by offering rebates to record companies in order to get their business. 
The Extension stated that, of the 6 per cent commission on mechanical royalties 
collected through a CLA, a rebate of two and a half percentage points would be 
given to the central licensor (i.e. the record company) and of the remaining three 
and half percentage points, 2.4 per cent would go to the distributing society in 
each country. This left the CLA collection society with a commission of only 1.1 per 
cent. With such a low margin, it would be very difficult for societies to attract new 
clients by increasing the rebate to record companies or by reducing the 1.1 per 
cent they retained to administer the deal – while at the same time complying with 
the terms of the Cannes Accord. 
Common Information System (CIS) and the IMJV
These limiting factors led the larger societies to look at the possibility of co-
operating rather than competing. They were already working together through 
CISAC, the International Confederation of Collecting Societies, to develop the so-
called the Common Information System (CIS), which offered the collection societies 
the possibility of undertaking certain routine tasks once electronically, instead of 
manually many times. 
The aim of CIS was to use a standard series of numbers (the International Standard 
Works Code or ISWC) to identify individual musical works and their owners in order to 
create a globally compatible virtual database of works. Each society would enter the 
details of its repertoire into the virtual central database of titles, thus eliminating the 
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need for other societies to re-enter the information. However, although the long-term 
advantages of CIS were apparent, it quickly became clear that its implementation 
would entail significant costs and logistical problems for the societies. CISAC set up 
a Pioneer Group to speed up the implementation of CIS in 1998 but was only able to 
make it mandatory for societies to use CIS-based data in 2000.
This meant that, in 1998, the combination of the economies demanded by the 
Cannes Accord and the costs associated with CIS led to a situation in which the 
larger European (mechanical) collection societies found it harder to compete with 
each other to secure CLA deals and the smaller societies found it harder to fund 
their share of the implementation of CIS.
Paradoxically, this was seen as an opportunity by some societies to rekindle 
competition between collection societies in the guise of the International Music 
Joint Venture (IMJV). In 1998 three of the world’s largest collecting societies 
established IMJV as a cost-saving venture for themselves, with part of the savings 
planned to come from selling the management of CIS and related back-office 
activities to other societies.
For a variety of societies, therefore, IMJV was intended to provide economies of 
scale, either as partners or clients. However, although the logic seemed compelling, 
many societies decided not to join IMJV for much more immediate and local 
reasons. For example, the USA performing right organisation BMI decided not to 
join because it considered that its computer system was as advanced as that being 
proposed by IMJV. On the other hand, the USA mechanical right organisation the 
Harry Fox Agency was not willing to make the necessary financial commitment to 
upgrading its computer systems. 
With hindsight, it is also apparent that local concerns as much as longer-term 
strategies motivated the IMJV’s founding partners. At the time they created IMJV, 
both the USA society ASCAP (BMI’s rival) and the UK societies MCPS and PRS 
needed to upgrade their computer systems and both saw IMJV as a way of doing 
so with the added advantage of selling on the functions allowed by the upgrade to 
other (smaller) societies. The concerns of the third founder, BUMA-STEMRA of 
the Netherlands, were even more local. The Dutch mechanical society STEMRA, 
having lost its central licensing deal with PolyGram (just prior to PolyGram’s 
becoming part of UMI, Universal Music International) needed to reduce costs but 
was unable under Dutch employment law to cut staff levels. It saw the IMJV as a 
way to redeploy staff. This explains why the IMJV headquarters was planned to be 
in Hoofddorp in the Netherlands. 
As development of the IMJV proceeded, the tensions between the local 
concerns of the founder members and the larger concerns of the project grew. This 
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was particularly noticeable during the period in which the IMJV courted GEMA as 
a possible member. As one of the largest European societies, GEMA was faced 
with making the greatest cost-savings to achieve the 6 per cent weighted European 
commission rate. Accordingly, IMJV initially looked attractive to GEMA. However, 
after a lengthy examination of IMJV, GEMA decided not to join. Some of the reasons 
were local. GEMA was unwilling to reduce its own staff levels so that STEMRA would 
not have to, and was concerned that it would lose contact with its members who 
would need to address any queries to Hoofddorp rather than a local German office. 
The need for IMJV’s operations to be centralised worried Europe’s large societies 
which had become increasingly protective about their national repertoire of musical 
works. For many, the location of IMJV in the Netherlands implied losing control 
of their data (and by implication their repertoire) with a consequent diminution in 
status. A further problem was that over the years it had become apparent that the 
integration of databases would not be as straightforward as initially envisaged by 
the IMJV. This had already been proven in the case of NORD– DOC, the joint 
Nordic works documentation and registration system, which, although eventually 
successful, was far more difficult to create than expected. Moreover, whereas 
NORD–DOC was created as a virtual database wholly within the society system, 
IMJV was seen by some as a threat to the society system. 
In particular, a number of the societies of smaller nations felt threatened by the 
IMJV. They saw their own disappearance as an inevitable consequence of IMJV 
and its proposed solutions to the problems of reducing costs. That concern was 
increased when the efficiencies being claimed by IMJV were hard to substantiate. 
For example, MCPS–PRS claimed at one time that the creation of the IMJV would 
cut the average administration costs of PRS to 10 per cent and of MCPS to 4 per 
cent. However, the integration of the databases of MCPS and PRS, which was 
required to create a platform for the subsequent creation of the IMJV database, 
proved to be far more problematic than expected and the saving far less.
IMJV’s business plan had envisaged a return on investment of about 30 per 
cent, with the profits being used not only to defray the costs incurred by the joint 
venture’s members, but also to give a return on investment for any private sector 
investor. This was highly significant because never before had there been a profit 
element in inter-society dealings. IMJV was also ambitiously hoping that it would 
later be able to undertake transaction switching and then real-time licensing and to 
offer its services to music publishers as well as to societies. 
However, none of this was to occur because in January 2002 the IMJV announced 
that it no longer intended to open its centre in the Netherlands. At a time when most 
societies were forecasting a decline in mechanical collections in the coming years, 
the partners were unwilling to invest more money in the project. 
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Common Information System and FastTrack
Although the IMJV idea was now dead, it was not the only response to the problems 
posed by the implementation of CIS. Another consortium of collection societies, 
known as FastTrack, whose aim was to implement CIS, arose out of the realisation 
that CISAC was in need of reform.
Founded in 1926 as a confederation of national authors’ societies, by the mid-
1960s CISAC had grown into a large, well-funded institution that was midway between 
an international trade association and a non-governmental lobbying organisation. 
As such it became highly bureaucratic, with several layers of administration. 
This process was further accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s as the cultural and 
commercial importance of intellectual property and its administration spread, 
requiring the formation of new national societies and the provision of assistance 
to small and undeveloped societies especially in Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia. 
CISAC saw its function as assisting these new societies.
By the late 1990s, the continuing pressure on the larger European societies to 
cut costs highlighted the significant amounts of money that were spent, often in 
inappropriate ways according to some, on CISAC’s administration. These costs were 
in the main paid by the larger societies, which increasingly sought ways to restrain 
and audit CISAC’s expenditure and to ensure that it prioritised the implementation 
of CIS and other projects related to the digital environment.
For these societies in particular, CIS promised to provide a way of contributing 
to the administrative savings required by the Cannes Accord through its greater 
efficiency in the registration of musical works, the exchange of that information 
between societies and the facilitation of (speedier) royalty payments. Hence it was 
those societies that most enthusiastically supported the possibilities that ISWC and 
CIS offered the CISAC membership.
CIS had been adopted as a goal by CISAC in 1995 but its cumbersome 
administrative structure had proved to be ill-equipped to bring the programme to 
fruition and the introduction of CIS was delayed several times. Subsequently, the 
larger societies were partially successful in reforming CISAC and at the CISAC 
Congress in Chile in 2000 it was reported that the creation of a group of ten 
societies to steer the implementation of CIS had resulted in the establishment of 
a streamlined CIS project for musical works only. Finally, in 2004, CISAC handed 
over to the FastTrack organisation the implementation and administration of CIS.
FastTrack was formed in 2000 by a group of societies that, for a variety of 
reasons, had not joined IMJV, but continued to have doubts about CISAC’s ability 
to see CIS through to a successful conclusion. In contrast to IMJV, FastTrack was 
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to be a network solution to the opportunities and problems posed by CIS. FastTrack 
planned to link the databases of U.S. collection agency BMI, France’s SACEM, 
Germany’s GEMA, Spain’s SGAE and Italy’s SIAE through the Internet. To do this 
each member society would create a clone of its database which member societies 
could then access, search, and raise questions about, and to which members 
could supply ancillary information. It was hoped that in this way data registration 
problems would be speedily eliminated.
 
Furthermore FastTrack would not require member societies to give up control of the 
administration of their repertoire. It would also be significantly cheaper to implement 
than IMJV, because it was essentially a secure Internet link between the member 
societies’ existing databases, and as such did not acquire any additional staff.
The first phase of FastTrack cost some $3m compared to the $20m that IMJV 
had set aside for start-up costs. Initially FastTrack’s aims were more limited than 
IMJV’s. It did not propose to offer third party back office solutions, and from the 
start its reliance on networking rather than the creation of a centralised service 
was attractive to other societies. Whereas the territories represented by the IMJV 
members generated a little over 20 per cent of world music publishing revenues, 
the revenues of the territories represented by the original FastTrack societies were 
twice that amount. This percentage continued to rise as other societies joined 
the new venture. In 2001 AKM/Austro-Mechana (Austria), SABAM (Belgium) and 
SUISA (Switzerland) joined FastTrack, and in 2003 two of the founder members of 
IMJV, MCPS-PRS and BUMA-STEMRA joined, as did Canada’s SOCAN, which 
had been a later member of IMJV. Finally, in March 2004 the third founding member 
of IMJV, ASCAP (USA), joined FastTrack. 
As more societies joined, CISAC chose to hand over the organisation and 
implementation of CIS to FastTrack. In January 2004, the Executive Bureau of 
CISAC and the Supervisory Board of FastTrack signed an agreement to adopt the 
FastTrack software, systems and data protocols as the basis of the next stage of 
CIS, CIS-Net. Later the same year CISAC formally announced that it would make 
the use of CIS-Net mandatory for its 209 member societies.
It remains to be seen whether the attempt to reposition CISAC as a more 
professional, cost-conscious and technical body will be successful. One mark of 
the success or otherwise of these changes, a test that CISAC has failed in the past, 
will be the ability of CISAC to enforce the use of CIS-Net by its member societies. 
At this point, it seemed that, after a lengthy series of wars of attrition, something 
like harmony had broken out in the collection society world. Such hopes were soon 
dashed by new disputes focused on European licensing issues. 
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Enter the European Commission
The first of these again concerned central licensing agreements. Although the Cannes 
Extension Agreement (CEA) had made it difficult for societies to compete for CLAs, 
some continued to do so and when MCPS refused to offer UMI (Universal Music 
International) a rebate in negotiations to extend an existing CLA, in 2003 UMI filed 
a complaint against MCPS with the European Commission Competition Authority. 
UMI interpreted the decision by MCPS to withdraw its rebate as a consequence of 
the restrictions placed on the actions of collection societies by the CEA. Earlier in the 
same year, UMI had filed another complaint at the European Commission, seeking a 
ruling that the pan-European mechanical royalty rate set out in the Standard Contract 
between IFPI and BIEM was too high and was anti-competitive.
The factors affecting European mechanical societies had changed since the 
implementation of the Cannes Agreement (CA) and its Extension Agreement (CEA). 
Whereas in the 1990s there were incentives for the societies to compete against 
each for CLAs, now the main incentive was for them to work together to reach cost 
saving targets and to satisfy the new demands (such as lower administration rates 
and greater transparency of accounting) being placed upon them by both their 
composer and publisher members. Moreover, at a time of a decline in the amount 
paid in European mechanical royalties (a direct consequence of falling recorded 
music sales), securing CLAs was no longer as attractive to societies, because of 
the costs involved, and the benefits of such deals were less clear. 
The complaints by UMI were an additional challenge to the principle of reciprocity, 
already undermined by the actions of the societies in the offline world. This assault 
on the societies was extended to the online world by the European Commission 
itself in 2005, when it proposed significant changes to the system of authors’ rights 
management by national collection societies. In order to remove obstacles to the 
growth of the online music market, the EC wanted to introduce a system whereby 
any national society could offer a pan-European licence for online uses of music 
and a composer could join any society irrespective of his place of residence or 
nationality.
The EC proposal was made in a staff working document entitled “Study on a 
Community Initiative on the Cross-Border Collective Management of Copyright”. In 
the study the EC outlined three different options for online licensing. These were:
To retain the current system of reciprocal agreements between national 1. 
societies
To modify that system 2. 
World Music: Roots and Routes
45
To introduce a new scheme whereby rights’ owners can authorise a single 3. 
society to manage the online uses of their works throughout the European 
Union (EU). 
The EC rejected Options 1 and 2, because the present arrangements require an 
online music company (intending to operate throughout the EU) having to seek up to 
25 separate national licences. The EC concluded that the only viable solution was 
Option 3, which it foresaw would lead to the emergence of a few powerful societies 
for online licensing. These in turn would effectively defend authors’ interests vis-à-
vis commercial users at the pan-European level.
The EC’s view was that a reduction in the number of what it terms “collective rights 
managers” or CRMs was a price worth paying for the more efficient administration 
of cross border rights, improvements which the EC saw as the central requirement 
for the emergence of a sizeable and commercially viable European online music 
market. The starting point of the EC study was the significant difference between 
the size of the USA and European online music markets. The EC report noted that 
the retail value of online European recorded music sales in 2004 was €27.2 million 
($49.5 million), but the retail value of U.S. sales was 130 per cent greater, at $113.8 
million. In contrast, according to IFPI, the retail value of offline soundcarrier sales in 
the U.S., at $12.85bn, was only 4 per cent greater than that of Europe, at $12.35bn. 
The EC study claimed that the gap between the European and USA online markets 
was the result of the greater obstacles to rights clearance and rights management 
facing would-be online music stores in the EU.
 
The EC’s plans were welcomed by some collection societies who foresaw that 
they would be among the few societies empowered by the developments the EC 
proposals are intended to foster. Indeed, in the conclusion of the EC’s study the authors 
noted that, while the study is directly concerned with the online music market, “We 
believe that Option 3 will also be the most sustainable long-term model” for the cross 
border distribution of offline royalties. In effect, if Option 3 were to be implemented it 
would bring about a complete restructuring of the collective administration of music 
copyrights throughout the EU. This would most likely entail the closure of many 
smaller societies, or at the very least a significant reduction of their activities, with a 
few large societies carrying out administration on their behalf. 
Ironically the EC study also offers evidence that even in the offline world the 
principles of reciprocity were already more sinned against than championed by 
the collection societies themselves. Using information compiled by the analysts 
Cap Gemini, the EC report notes that there “is no commensurate relation between 
non-domestic repertoire exploited in a particular Member State and the transfer 
of royalties to non-domestic right-holders”. Thus, although foreign repertoire 
accounted for between 55 and 62 per cent of music works exploited in Spain 
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in 2004, the royalties distributed by Spanish authors’ society SGAE to foreign 
collection societies was less than 12 per cent of its total collections. At the same 
time, according to the Cap Gemini study, the royalties paid to foreign societies 
by four large European societies (GEMA, SACEM, SGAE and SIAE) have grown 
at lower rates than their general rates of growth and that in 2003 of the €4.9bn 
($5.5bn) collected by European collection societies, €3.8bn ($4.7bn) was distributed 
to authors and publishers, of which only 13.3 per cent (€506m, $624.7 million) went 
to foreign copyright owners.
Conclusion
This chapter has presented the various ways in which the principle of reciprocity 
between national collection societies has come under attack from various 
directions in the past two decades.1 The forces undermining the reciprocity system 
have included users (the major international record companies) and creators’ 
representatives (music publishing companies) whose own activities are global and 
transnational in scope. The third force working to the same effect has been the 
regulator in the form of the European Commission, committed to a pan-European 
free market in intellectual property. Last, but not least, the national societies 
themselves have been undoing their working principles. The societies have begun 
to negate their own system of reciprocity both in competing with one another 
for Central Licensing Agreements and in co-operating to create the Common 
Information System, which has the potential to make separate national repertoire 
databases redundant. Consequently, in the case of Europe in particular it seems 
that the regional rather than the national territory is about to become the basis of 
the new world facing the collection societies. 
1 Following the period documented in this article, the European Commission upheld a complaint 
about music licensing by the pan-European broadcaster RTL. It would take a further essay 
to elucidate the EC adjudication, the responses to it by the collection societies, the subsequent 
recommendations of the EC concerning the administration of digital music rights within the European 
Community and the response of music publishers and societies to those recommendations. That 
said, this article indicates the continuing paths of development brought about by the increased focus 
on copyright administration in the current era.
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